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Production Environment and Yield Risk
In this chapter, farming activities of sample households are characterized with
estimation results of the extent of yield variability facing each household. As
shown in Chapter 2, farming activities, comprising crops and livestock, ac-
counted for the major share of household income. As a necessary background
to investigate how the two sectors are interrelated with household consump-
tion characteristics, this chapter first gives relevant information on agricul-
tural production from both technological and economic aspects. Topics in-
clude cropping pattern, livestock activities, and irrigation technology and water
transactions. Then in the second section, the extent of yield variability at the
individual household level is estimated econometrically. An important aspect
of the estimated model is that common and idiosyncratic shocks are distin-
guished. Since very few studies have investigated the idiosyncratic yield shocks
in Pakistan’s agriculture, the estimation is expected to give an important in-
sight into their magnitude.
I. Farming Systems
1. Cropping Patterns
The rice-wheat zone is characterized by two dominant crops: rice in kharif
and wheat in rabi (Table 3-1). Basmati paddy is the most important crop in
kharif and also the most important cash crop for farmers in the study area.
Area devoted to basmati was around 6 acres on average. The imputed con-
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sumption expenditure for rice accounted for less than 4 per cent in the family
budget on average, indicating that rice is mostly cultivated as a cash crop. All
sample households had market surplus of basmati. Other kharif crops, such as
the IRRI variety of paddy, sugarcane, cotton, and maize for grain, accounted
for only minor shares.
Wheat occupied approximately 6 to 7 acres in rabi on average. Wheat is the
largest source of calorie intake and the imputed consumption expenditure on
wheat accounted for 13 to 14 per cent in the family budget.
Next to rice and wheat, fodder crops for livestock animals accounted for a
large proportion of cropped land both in kharif and rabi. Kharif fodder crops
occupied about 2 acres and rabi fodder crops occupied about 1.5 to 2 acres on
average (Table 3-1). Most farmers in the area kept livestock animals and allo-
cated a significant proportion of the cultivated land to fodder crops. The domi-
nant fodder crop in kharif was jowar (sorghum), and that in rabi was berseem,
the Pakistani name for Egyptian clover. The sum of areas devoted to fodder
TABLE  3-1
CROPPING PATTERNS OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS
(Acres)
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
Standard Standard Standard
Deviation Deviation Deviation
Continuously surveyed households only (NOB=59)
Acreage under basmati 5.676 5.724 5.731 5.076 5.741 5.444
Acreage under wheat 6.022 5.719 5.896 4.971 6.339 5.634
Acreage under kharif fodder 2.860 1.847 1.847 1.254 1.845 1.239
Acreage under rabi fodder 1.618 1.098 1.545 1.012 1.691 1.263
All households (NOB=97)
Acreage under basmati 6.226 5.952 6.514 6.158 6.595 6.375
Acreage under wheat 6.856 6.071 6.455 5.368 6.888 5.830
Acreage under kharif fodder 2.899 1.819 1.955 1.229 1.916 1.188
Acreage under rabi fodder 1.644 1.110 1.659 1.082 1.825 1.285
Absolute value of t-statisticsa
Acreage under basmati 1.127 1.553 1.635
Acreage under wheat 1.678* 1.271 1.149
Acreage under kharif fodder 0.264 1.067 0.728
Acreage under rabi fodder 0.284 1.286 1.274
Source: The author’s calculation.  The original information was collected by the Punjab
Economic Research Institute. See the text in Chapter 2 for more details.
Note: NOB stands for the number of observations.
a
“Absolute value of t-statistics” shows t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the means
of continuously and noncontinuously surveyed samples are identical.
* The null is rejected at 10%.
Mean Mean Mean
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crops and the dominant cereal crops (rice in kharif; wheat in rabi) exceeded
90 per cent of the cultivated area in each season. According to the Agricul-
tural Census 1990, aggregate figures for these numbers are 80 per cent in the
rice-wheat zone and around 90 per cent in the Sheikhupura district (GOP,
Agricultural Census Organization 1994).
Since basmati paddy occupies the land for a longer period than other kharif
crops, crop rotation from basmati to wheat was once a difficult task for farm-
ers. However, the introduction of a new variety called Basmati-385 almost
resolved this problem since it is an early maturing variety. In the mid-1980s,
Basmati-385 replaced old varieties very quickly in the rice-wheat zone (Sharif
et al. 1989; Amir and Aslam 1992). Only this variety was cultivated by sample
households during the survey period.
Table 3-2 gives the average land productivity of cereal crops. Twenty
maunds1 per acre are equivalent to about two tons per hectare and thirty maunds
per acre to about three tons per hectare. Therefore, per-acre yields of wheat
and basmati are low, compared with neighboring countries and with achieve-
ments in research stations in Pakistan (GOP, Ministry of Food and Agricul-
ture 1988). In the study area, mean yields of these two crops stagnated during
the 1980s. Not only the food-grain yields were low, but also they fluctuated
significantly. Basmati and wheat experienced good harvests in 1988/89.
Basmati suffered a bad harvest in 1990/91 and wheat did in 1989/90 and 1990/
91. On average, the worst basmati harvest occurred in 1990/91 which was 18
TABLE  3-2
PER-ACRE YIELD OF CEREALS
(Maunds/acre)
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
Standard Standard Standard
Deviation Deviation Deviation
Continuously surveyed households only (NOB=59)
Basmati paddy 27.70 5.95 29.41 6.08 23.53 5.47
Wheat 27.59 4.60 20.81 5.33 20.10 5.00
All households (NOB=97)
Basmati paddy 28.46 6.22 29.80 5.93 23.40 4.86
Wheat 27.79 4.91 20.54 5.02 20.25 4.99
Absolute value of t-statisticsa
Basmati paddy 1.484 0.791 0.323
Wheat 0.504 0.651 0.354
Source: See Table 3-1.
Notes: One maund is equivalent to approximately 40 kg.
a See Table 3-1.
Mean Mean Mean
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per cent less and the worst wheat harvest occurred in 1990/91 which was 27
per cent less than those in 1988/89. Furthermore, these aggregated numbers
conceal substantial yield fluctuations at the individual farm level. This issue
will be discussed further in the second section of this chapter.
2. Cost of Production of Basmati Paddy and Wheat
The data set includes ample information on the use of production inputs for
basmati paddy and wheat for each household. Data on the quantities of inputs
used and output produced on each farm are available, separately for the two
crops. Using this information, the technology for, and profitability of, produc-
ing these two crops were assessed.
Table 3-3 summarizes factor inputs and output of basmati production in
1990/91. Numbers express per-acre quantities. The table shows unweighted
means and standard deviations among households. The mean of paddy output
per acre from all observations in 1990/91 was 23.40 maunds. To produce this
output, labor input of 201 hours per acre, of which 69 were derived from hired
labor, bullock labor of 10.5 hours per acre, and tractor use of 3.6 hours per
acre were applied. Standard deviations are relatively large and the ranges of
variation are wide.
The table also shows these figures by farmland size: marginal (up to 6.25
acres), small (6.25 to 12.5 acres) and medium and large (above 12.5 acres).
Output per acre was similar across sizes, implying the absence of positive or
negative size-yield correlations. Total labor input was higher in marginal- and
small-size farms. Medium- and large-size farms substituted labor by using
machinery, such as tractors, reapers, and combine harvesters. The share of
hired labor was not low, however, even in marginal farms. It was common
even for marginal farmers to hire non–family labor in operations such as trans-
planting and harvesting. Bullock-labor inputs were the highest in the small-
size farms. For marginal farms, since keeping a pair of bullocks is not eco-
nomical, the farmers relied more on hired tractor service. Larger farms also
relied more on tractor services, whether owned or rented.
Table 3-4 shows similar information for wheat. The average output per-
acre from all observations was 20.25 maunds. Output per acre was higher for
farms with larger sizes, but the difference was negligible compared with the
standard deviations. To produce this output, labor input of 66.2 hours per
acre, of which 19.9 were derived from hired labor, bullock labor of 3.6 hours
per acre, and tractor use of 2.4 hours per acre were applied. Total labor input
was much lower than that for basmati production because transplantation op-
eration is not required for wheat and harvesting mechanization is more ad-
vanced in wheat production in the study area.2 As in the case of basmati, all
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sample households hired non–family labor. This applied to marginal farmers
also, though they depended relatively less on hired labor. Similarly, bullock
labor input was the highest in the small-size farms and tractor use was the
highest in the medium- and large-size farms.
Net surplus accrued to farmers from this production process is estimated in
Tables 3-5 and 3-6. The value of output from cereal crop production was evalu-
ated at farm-gate prices actually observed. The value of the total output is
expressed by the sum of grain value and the value of byproduct (straw) im-
puted at market prices in villages. For the costs of pesticides, chemical fertil-
izers, and tubewell water application, the amount actually paid by households
was recorded. The costs of factor inputs of human labor, bullock labor, and
tractor use were imputed at a single opportunity wage. Considering the varia-
TABLE  3-3
FACTOR INPUTS AND OUTPUT OF BASMATI PER ACRE, 1990/91
Standard
Deviation
All size (NOB=97)
Basmati paddy output (maund) 23.40 4.86 15.00 38.00
Total labor (hours) 200.75 34.90 95.46 322.50
Hired labor (hours) 68.93 31.92 1.78 108.00
Bullock labor (hours) 10.51 14.71 0.00 49.12
Tractor use (hours) 3.58 2.01 0.00 8.92
Marginal size (NOB=37)
Basmati paddy output (maund) 22.95 5.23 15.00 38.00
Total labor (hours) 207.68 31.24 160.20 322.50
Hired labor (hours) 52.30 39.86 1.78 108.00
Bullock labor (hours) 7.78 15.53 0.00 49.12
Tractor use (hours) 3.48 1.70 0.00 8.28
Small size (NOB=36)
Basmati paddy output (maund) 23.91 5.05 15.00 38.00
Total labor (hours) 208.48 32.88 155.23 320.11
Hired labor (hours) 82.10 14.86 32.86 102.00
Bullock labor (hours) 14.69 15.10 0.00 43.56
Tractor use (hours) 2.85 1.73 0.00 6.70
Medium and large size (NOB=24)
Basmati paddy output (maund) 23.33 4.05 18.00 33.00
Total labor (hours) 178.45 34.96 95.46 215.44
Hired labor (hours) 74.81 26.05  33.44 99.43
Bullock labor (hours) 8.43 11.64 0.00 31.44
Tractor use (hours) 4.81 2.32 1.00 8.92
Source: See Table 3-1.
Notes: Unweighted mean and standard errors among households are indicated in this
table.
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TABLE  3-4
FACTOR INPUTS AND OUTPUT OF WHEAT PER ACRE, 1990/91
Standard
Deviation
All size (NOB=97)
Wheat output (maund) 20.25 5.00 6.86 30.00
Total labor (hours) 66.15 13.51 32.08 109.17
Hired labor (hours) 19.92 16.82 0.89 50.57
Bullock labor (hours) 3.57 6.85 0.00 40.50
Tractor use (hours) 2.39 1.17 0.00 5.88
Marginal size (NOB=37)
Wheat output (maund) 19.60 4.84 6.86 30.00
Total labor (hours) 68.68 13.95 42.93 109.17
Hired labor (hours) 12.73 16.33 0.89 50.57
Bullock labor (hours) 2.87 8.15 0.00 40.50
Tractor use (hours) 2.11 0.77 0.00 3.00
Small size (NOB=36)
Wheat output (maund) 20.07 5.40 10.00 30.00
Total labor (hours) 65.18 10.66 40.61 85.50
Hired labor (hours) 19.90 15.86 1.50 48.67
Bullock labor (hours) 4.54 5.64 0.00 14.25
Tractor use (hours) 2.11 0.96 1.00 4.76
Medium and large size (NOB=24)
Wheat output (maund) 21.51 4.57 15.00 30.00
Total labor (hours) 63.68 16.32 32.08 95.75
Hired labor (hours) 31.01 12.97 6.57 48.67
Bullock labor (hours) 3.20 6.39 0.00 25.00
Tractor use (hours) 3.25 1.54 0.75 5.88
Source: See Table 3-1.
Notes: Unweighted mean and standard errors among households are indicated in this
table.
tion in the rates and the modes of payment of wages in sample villages,3 this
imputation should be interpreted as a very crude proxy. Using information
from the Punjab Economic Research Institute (e.g., Saleem and Cheema 1993),
the opportunity wages were estimated at Rs. 40 / man-day (= 7 hours) for hu-
man labor, Rs. 15.08 / hour for bullock labor, and Rs. 100 / hour for tractor
services.
For basmati paddy (Table 3-5), the value of total output ranged from Rs.
2,090 to Rs. 5,306 per acre. Its unweighted mean among households was Rs.
3,287, whereas its acreage-weighted mean was Rs. 3,246. Because the differ-
ence in paddy yields between smaller and larger farm households was not
significant, the two means were close. Among the input costs, labor cost was
the largest, accounting for about one-third of the value of output. The costs of
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tractor use, fertilizer, and tubewell water were similar in magnitude, account-
ing for about one-tenth of the output value, respectively. Net surplus after
subtracting all labor and other costs in the table was estimated at a little more
than Rs. 700 per acre. Considering the opportunity land rent at about Rs. 750,
and other charges of land revenue and canal water charges (Rs. 64), and inter-
ests on investment (Rs. 127) (Saleem and Cheema 1993), the operator’s re-
turn should be negative. With family labor wages added, household income
from basmati production became positive for most sample observations, how-
ever. These results show that the cultivation of basmati under the ongoing
price structure was at a level that leaves no operator’s profit. Returns were just
sufficient for the farmers to keep farming.
For wheat (Table 3-6), the value of the total output ranged from Rs. 857 to
Rs. 3,750 per acre. Its unweighted mean of Rs. 2,473 was smaller than its
acreage-weighted mean of Rs. 2,566 because larger farms’ per-acre yields
were higher. Compared with basmati production, the share of labor cost and
tubewell water cost to the value of output was smaller, reflecting the nature of
TABLE  3-5
OUTPUT VALUE AND INPUT COSTS OF PRODUCTION OF BASMATI PER ACRE, 1990/91
(Nominal Rs.)
(1) (2)
Standard Standard
Deviation Deviation
Value of basmati paddy 3,188.3 668.6 3,147.2 555.3 2,025.0 5,206.0
Value of paddy and
by-products 3,287.3 670.4 3,246.4 556.9 2,090.0 5,306.0
Total labor cost 1,147.1 199.4 1,056.5 222.7 545.5 1,842.9
Hired labor cost 393.9 182.4 428.4 146.0 10.2 617.1
Bullock cost 158.4 221.9 146.6 197.3 0.0 740.7
Tractor cost 357.6 201.1 408.7 219.5 0.0 892.3
Seed cost 20.2 6.9 19.9 5.7 8.9  53.3
Farmyard manure and
fertilizer cost 321.7 146.7 348.0 113.4 40.5 996.0
Plant protection cost 57.3 78.7 66.3 83.0 0.0 338.0
Tubewell irrigation cost 451.4 295.2 460.7 191.9 0.0 1,440.0
Combine and reaper costs 10.3 44.5 29.1 70.9 0.0 200.0
Net surplus 763.3 735.2 710.8 629.9 −610.1 2,426.0
Net surplus + family labor
wage 1,516.6 761.4 1,338.9 638.6 8.9 3,326.2
Source: See Table 3-1.
Notes: (1): Unweighted mean and standard errors among households are indicated.
(2): Mean and standard errors are weighted by the size of area under basmati
paddy.
Mean Mean
Minimum Maximum
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TABLE  3-6
OUTPUT VALUE AND INPUT COSTS OF PRODUCTION OF WHEAT PER ACRE, 1990/91
(Nominal Rs.)
(1) (2)
Standard Standard
Deviation Deviation
Value of wheat grain 2,191.7 555.8 2,273.0 527.6 754.3 3,300.0
Value of wheat and
by-products 2,473.4 642.7 2,566.1 611.2 857.1 3,750.0
Total labor cost 378.0 77.2 357.5 83.3 183.3 623.8
Hired labor cost 113.8 96.1 134.6 87.7 5.1 289.0
Bullock cost 53.8 103.2 51.5 99.4 0.0 610.7
Tractor cost 239.3 117.0 287.0 151.5 0.0 588.3
Chemical fertilizer cost 362.6 133.6 401.8 129.1 175.0 640.0
Plant protection cost 10.6 37.0 25.4 54.2 0.0 250.0
Tubewell irrigation cost 81.7 62.3 93.5 50.4 0.0 272.8
Combine and reaper cost 28.4 95.4 69.9 145.4 0.0 550.0
Net surplus 1,319.0 628.8 1,279.7 624.1 −233.5 2,871.9
Net surplus + family labor
wage 1,583.1 647.5 1,502.5 640.9 173.6 3,174.8
Source: See Table 3-1.
Notes: (1): Unweighted mean and standard errors among households are indicated.
(2): Mean and standard errors are weighted by the size of area under basmati
paddy.
Mean Mean
Minimum Maximum
wheat production. Fertilizer cost and labor cost were the most important in-
puts in terms of expenditure. Interestingly, when unweighted average among
households was used, the mean labor cost was larger than the mean fertilizer
cost. When means were calculated with a weight of wheat acreage, the mean
fertilizer cost was larger than the mean labor cost. This implies that larger
farms used more fertilizer and smaller farms used more labor, which may be
explained by the difference in the opportunity costs of these factors among
farmers due to the existence of transaction costs (Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995,
ch. 9).
Net surplus from wheat production after subtracting all labor and other
costs was estimated at about Rs. 1,300 per acre. Due to lower input expendi-
ture, net surplus for wheat became much larger than that for basmati paddy,
which is associated with higher output value and higher expenditure. After
subtracting the implicit land rent of Rs. 800, land revenue (Rs. 4.6), canal
water charges (Rs. 21.6), and interests on investment (Rs. 78.1) (Saleem and
Cheema 1993), the mean of operator’s return still remained positive, although
low. With family-labor wages added, household income from wheat produc-
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tion became more positive. These results show that wheat cultivation was
more profitable than that of basmati but the difference was not appreciable.
Many sample households cultivate wheat mainly as their staple food, though.
3. Livestock Activities and Mixed Farming
The role of livestock in the study area is closely related to crop production
and family consumption (Kurosaki 1995a). First, bullocks provide draft power
in crop cultivation, although this role has declined due to the increased use of
tractors. Second, she-buffaloes and cows produce milk. Milk is consumed
directly and in processed forms such as ghee (butter oil), lassi (yoghurt drink),
paneer (cheese), etc., as well as sold to markets for a daily flow of additional
income. Third, livestock provide valuable by-products used as fuel and farm-
yard manure. Fourth, crop by-products such as rice straw and bhusa (wheat
straw) can be utilized effectively as dry fodder. Fifth, crop rotations, includ-
ing leguminous fodder crops, can improve the soil fertility. Sixth, family la-
bor, especially female or child labor with low and uncertain opportunities for
outside employment, can find a stable employment throughout the year in
livestock breeding. Seventh, livestock are a liquid form of assets that can be
depleted in a bad year and therefore act as an insurance. For these reasons, the
social status of a farm household in the study area is a function not only of its
landholding size but also of its livestock herd size (Hirashima 1978).
From the viewpoint of risk diversification, keeping livestock is associated
with both positive and negative aspects. Yields of fodder crops and milk are
not as erratic as those of food grains. On the other hand, keeping livestock
implies another source of risk such as disease, death, or theft of the animals.
However, the probability that these losses occur simultaneously with crop
damages is not likely to be high except for disasters such as a severe flood.
Table 3-7 shows the size of livestock holding. The number of bullocks for
cultivation has declined over the three-year survey period, partly due to the
development of a tractor service market and partly to the substitution by milch
animals. No bullock rental was observed.
Milch animals, especially she-buffaloes, had replaced draft animals in the
study area. On average, sample households had two adult she-buffaloes in the
first two years and the number rose to about three in the last year. Due to this
increase, the overall size of a milch livestock herd as well as of total livestock
herd in adult-animal equivalent units (AU)4 increased in the last year.
Milk yields from cows and she-buffaloes are reported in Table 3-8. On
average, an adult she-buffalo (1.28 AU) produces about 1,500 liters of milk a
year, a quantity sufficient for household consumption of an average family
size. The consumption expenditure on milk and milk products was imputed to
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be around 27 per cent of the family budget, a value about twice as large as that
of wheat, reflecting the importance of milk as a source of animal protein for
sample households. Two to three adult she-buffaloes in milk are more than
household consumption needs so that the surplus can be sold to the market.
The average milk yield recorded a decrease in the last year because of the
herd size expansion.
Table 3-8 gives information on livestock feed in terms of monetary values
(nominal) evaluated at village prices. Green fodder from specialized fodder
crops such as jowar and berseem accounted for the largest share of feed ex-
penditure, and for about 80 per cent of the total expenditure. These fodder
crops are cut into pieces, mixed with dry fodder, and fed to animals without
further treatment. Common sources of dry fodder are bhusa and rice straw
produced from the farm. Green and dry fodder are complements rather than
substitutes in milk production. Concentrate feeds are essential for milk pro-
duction. In the study area, cottonseed cake is used for this purpose. Since the
cake is not produced in the villages, it is purchased from markets.
TABLE  3-7
SIZE OF LIVESTOCK HOLDING
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
Standard Standard Standard
Deviation Deviation Deviation
Continuously surveyed households only (NOB=59)
Number of adult she-buffaloes 1.932 0.998 1.915 1.055 2.797 0.971
Number of adult bullocks 1.068 1.065 1.203 1.047 0.763 1.147
AU of total milch animals 4.309 2.324 4.357 2.166 5.558 1.989
AU of total draft animals 1.616 1.155 1.751 1.185 1.282 3.361
AU of total livestock animals 5.925 2.909 6.108 2.924 6.840 4.022
All households (NOB=97)
Number of adult she-buffaloes 1.959 1.029 1.928 1.166 2.979 1.014
Number of adult bullocks 1.031 1.074 1.206 1.050 0.856 1.173
AU of total milch animals 4.297 2.636 4.385 2.540 5.693 2.109
AU of total draft animals 1.586 1.227 1.732 1.186 1.389 3.506
AU of total livestock animals 5.883 3.110 6.116 3.150 7.082 4.150
Absolute value of t-statisticsa
Number of adult she-buffaloes 0.315 0.132 1.058
Number of adult bullocks 0.419 0.033 1.119
AU of total milch animals 0.056 0.134 0.473
AU of total draft animals 0.295 0.201 1.113
AU of total livestock animals 0.164 0.033 0.714
Source: See Table 3-1.
Note: AU stands for adult-animal equivalent unit.
a See Table 3-1.
Mean Mean Mean
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4. Land Allocation and Production Assets
Two types of crops, cereals and fodder, compete for land in the study area.
How did sample households determine the land allocation between the two
crops? Two hypotheses for crop choices are examined graphically below.
The first hypothesis is the fodder-sufficiency-first model, which is based on
the assumption that farmers first put aside their land for their fodder require-
ment and never depend on outside markets to compensate for the deficit as
long as land was available to produce it. The mathematical programming lit-
erature often employs this assumption (Gotsch et al. 1975; Perry 1982). If
farmers produce surplus fodder, they can sell it but cannot purchase deficit
fodder. The assumption might have been valid for earlier days in the Pakistan
Punjab when  markets for fodder were relatively less developed. However, it
does not seem to be appropriate presently considering that a number of sample
TABLE  3-8
MILK YIELDS AND FODDER FEEDING
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
Standard Standard Standard
Deviation Deviation Deviation
Continuously surveyed and milk-producing households only (NOB= 58, 59, 58)a
Milk yields (maund/AU) 30.91 9.84 29.39 10.37 26.94 9.53
Green fodder
expenditure (Rs.) 1,547.0 699.0 1,551.7 731.8 1,622.0 191.7
Dry fodder expenditure (Rs.) 457.9 344.2 481.5 316.9 395.6 253.2
Concentrate expenditure (Rs.) 192.6 91.7 138.3 112.2 134.9 780.3
All milk-producing households (NOB = 96, 97, 96)a
Milk yields (maund/AU) 31.85 10.32 30.43 10.26 27.18 9.28
Green fodder
expenditure (Rs.) 1,589.5 685.6 1,676.5 799.0 1,653.9 221.8
Dry fodder expenditure (Rs.) 507.7 343.0 558.8 410.5 420.4 246.2
Concentrate expenditure (Rs.) 202.1 104.1 137.7 103.4 153.6 797.1
Absolute value of t-statisticsb
Milk yields (maund/AU) 1.108 1.243 0.312
Green fodder
expenditure (Rs.) 0.746 1.908* 0.483
Dry fodder expenditure (Rs.) 1.751 2.298** 1.211
Concentrate expenditure (Rs.) 1.103 0.067 1.013
Source: See Table 3-1.
a One household in year 1988/89 and another in year 1990/91 did not produce any
milk.
b See note a to Table 3-1.
* The null is rejected at 10%.
** The null is rejected at 5%.
Mean Mean Mean
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households purchased fodder even though land was available to grow fodder
crops.
Figures 3-1 and 3-2 plot fodder acreage against the size of livestock herd to
examine whether this hypothesis is valid. Sample households were classified
by their marketing status into three categories: those who were self-sufficient
(no sale and no purchase), those who sold to the market, and those who pur-
chased from the market. The straight line shows the required fodder acreage
based on the mean value of fodder inputs to livestock animals.5
As a crude approximation, the fodder-sufficiency-first model explains the
observations partially in a sense that all the deficit households lay below the
line of estimated acreage requirement and most of the surplus households
above the line. In this sense, household crop choices were close to the behav-
ior under missing fodder markets, despite observed participation in fodder
markets. However, under the fodder-sufficiency-first hypothesis, deficit house-
Fig. 3-1. Fodder Acreage and Livestock Herd Sizes in Kharif
Source: Drawn by the author. See Table 3-1.
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holds should have allocated all available land to fodder. This is not supported
by the data since all deficit households in the sample allocated a substantial
proportion of their land to non-fodder crops. Therefore, the data do not sup-
port strictly the simple hypothesis of a fodder-sufficiency-first model. The
conclusion is the same when the acreage share of fodder is plotted against the
livestock herd size per farmland.
Another hypothesis is a portfolio model that characterizes households’ land
allocation decisions as a portfolio choice between two risky activities: a food-
grain crop and a fodder crop. If three conditions hold, the portfolio theory
predicts that the shares of the two crops should be a monotonic function of the
agent’s wealth (Arrow 1971; Feder 1980; Just and Zilberman 1983). The three
conditions are: the household is maximizing expected utility from the net rev-
enue from two activities; the distribution of per-unit profits from the activities
is independent of the household’s production choice;6 and, the risk preference
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Fig. 3-2. Fodder Acreage and Livestock Herd Sizes in Rabi
Source: Drawn by the author. See Table 3-1.
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structure is homogeneous among households and the Arrow-Pratt coefficient
of relative risk aversion is a monotonically increasing or decreasing function
of the agent’s wealth. Under this set of assumptions, the share of each activity
is invariant when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is constant with re-
spect to wealth (Arrow 1971, pp. 119–20). When it is not, the share either
increases or decreases with wealth monotonically depending upon the sign
and the magnitude of the covariance of the net revenues from the two risky
activities (Just and Zilberman 1983).
Figures 3-3 and 3-4 plot the share of fodder crops to available land against
the household wealth. Available land defined as the sum of the land cultivated
with fodder crops, wheat or basmati, and the current fallow.7 Household wealth
is defined here as the sum of the land value, livestock value, and house value,
evaluated at 1988/89 prices.8 The two figures show neither a monotonically
increasing nor a monotonically decreasing relationship between the share and
the wealth level, which is suggested by a simple portfolio hypothesis. At lower
levels of wealth, shares vary significantly among households; as wealth in-
creases, there seems to be a convergence to a certain level. These results may
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Fig. 3-3. Share of Fodder Acreage and Household Wealth in Kharif
Source: Drawn by the author. See Table 3-1.
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be due to the heterogeneity in risk preferences among households or to the
possibility that households consider other aspects than net revenue from crops
when they maximize expected utility (Chapter 6).
5. Farm Mechanization, Tubewell Irrigation, and Water Transactions
The number of bullocks for cultivation has declined (Table 3-7), because
tractor power is now widely available. Although only 14 per cent of sample
households owned tractors, almost every household had access to tractor ser-
vices (Table 3-9). Cultivation using tractors is a rule rather than an exception
in the study area, implying that the level of technology applied is more ad-
vanced than the national average, which is consistent in taking account of the
context of agriculture in the Punjab (GOP, Agricultural Census Organization
1987). Tractor cultivation services are available in the villages on a fixed wage
basis.
Another important characteristic of the Punjab agriculture is the use of
tubewells with diesel or electric pump sets. Although the study area is 100 per
cent irrigated by perennial canals, water supply is uncertain and cannot meet
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Source: Drawn by the author. See Table 3-1.
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farmers’ need in time and in quantity. Tubewell technology fills this gap in
water requirement. In the Punjab province as a whole in 1990, the cultivated
area irrigated by canals and tubewells accounted for 53 per cent of the total
irrigated area, whereas the area irrigated by canals alone accounted for 25 per
cent and the area irrigated by tubewells alone accounted for 20 per cent (GOP,
Agricultural Census Organization 1994).
The number of sample households who owned tubewells increased in the
second year and they accounted for about three-fourths in the last two years
(Table 3-9). Therefore, the majority of households owned tubewells. Even if a
household did not own a tubewell, it had access to tubewell water by purchas-
ing.
Water transactions observed in the study area consisted of water sales on an
hourly cash basis. In various areas in South Asia, land tenancy contracts linked
with water transactions have been observed since the tubewell technology
became popular (Fujita and Hossain 1995; Shah 1993). Such arrangements
were not observed among the sample households, although a three-party-share-
cropping arrangement among landlords, tenants, and tubewell owners pre-
vails in the more water-scarce area of the rice-wheat zone in the Punjab (Ali
1995). In Pakistan in general, fixed cash payments are becoming popular,
although sharecropping arrangements are also prevalent (Chaudhry 1990).
In Tables 3-10 to 3-12, information on tubewell irrigation and water trans-
actions is summarized for the continuously surveyed households. Sample
households with tubewells used both canal and tubewell water for cultivating
basmati and wheat, except for some cases where only canal water was applied
to wheat (Table 3-10). Some of the households without tubewells relied only
on canal water and others purchased tubewell water to supplement canal wa-
ter. Water purchase was more common in the cultivation of basmati than wheat.
This is understandable since water control is more critical in cultivation of
paddy than wheat. The number of households who purchased water declined
in the last two years when some of the households became tubewell owners.
Table 3-11 lists water rates paid by sample households who purchased
tubewell water. The rates ranged from Rs. 12 to Rs. 30 per hour. The range of
variation was small except for basmati in 1988/89. Comparison of Tables 3-
10 and 3-11 shows that the nominal water rates remained unchanged and dis-
played a smaller intra-year variation in later years as the number of tubewell
owners increased. One interpretation of this finding is that households who
purchased more expensive water in the first year were the ones who became
tubewell owners in later years. Another interpretation could be the effect of
increased competition among potential water sellers in later years because the
number of tubewell owners increased. These data suggest that discriminatory
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TABLE  3-9
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS WHO OWNED AND USED MACHINERY
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91
No. % No. % No.  %
 Continuously surveyed households only (NOB=59)
Households who owned a tractor 6 10.2 6 10.2 7 11.9
Households who used tractor cultivation 56 94.9 59 100.0 58 98.3
Households who owned a tubewell 34 57.6 45 76.3 44 74.6
Households who used tubewell water 55 93.2 54 91.5 48 81.4
All households (NOB=97)
Households who owned a tractor 14 14.4 13 13.4 13 13.4
Households who used tractor cultivation 93 95.9 97 100.0 95 97.9
Households who owned a tubewell 59 60.8 73 75.3 70 72.2
Households who used tubewell water 91 93.8 88 90.7 81 83.5
Source: See Table 3-1.
TABLE  3-10
IRRIGATION METHODS ADOPTED BY SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS
Only Canal Water Canal & Tubewell Water
Nonowner Owner Nonowner Owner
1988/89
Basmati 6 0 19 34 59
(10.2) (0.0) (32.2) (57.6) (100.0)
Wheat 19 0 6 34 59
(32.2) (0.0) (10.2) (57.6) (100.0)
1989/90
Basmati 6 0 8 45 59
(10.2) (0.0) (13.6) (76.3) (100.0)
Wheat 10 1 4 44 59
(16.9) (1.7) (6.8) (74.6) (100.0)
1990/91
Basmati 12 0 3 44 59
(20.3) (0.0) (5.1) (74.6) (100.0)
Wheat 14 2 1 42 59
(23.7) (3.4) (1.7) (71.2) (100.0)
Source: See Table 3-1.
Notes: 1. Continuously surveyed households only.
2. “Owner” and “Nonowner” correspond to the ownership of a tubewell.
3. Figures in parentheses are percentages.
Total
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TABLE  3-12
TUBEWELL WATER COSTS BORNE BY TUBEWELL OWNERS
(Rs./hour)
Standard No. of Tube- Ratio of
Deviation well Owners Price/Costa
 1988/89 13.14 3.75 4.99 22.26 34 1.504
 1989/90 12.42 1.99 9.17 16.59 45 1.174
 1990/91 13.67 2.05 8.73 17.79 44 1.281
Source: See Table 3-1.
Note: Continuously surveyed households only.
a The mean of water prices obtained from Table 3-11 divided by the mean of water
costs shown in this table.
Mean Minimum Maximum
TABLE  3-11
PRICES ACTUALLY PAID BY BUYERS OF TUBEWELL WATER
(Rs./hour)
Standard
Deviation
1988/89
Basmati 18.89 4.95 12 30 19
Wheat 22.50 2.74 20 25 6
1989/90
Basmati 15.13 1.36 12 16 8
Wheat 13.50 1.73 12 15 4
1990/91
Basmati 16.67 2.89 15 20 3
Wheat 20.00 0.00 20 20 1
  Source: See Table 3-1.
  Note: Continuously surveyed households only.
Mean Minimum Maximum NOB
pricing, as in the monopoly model, does not operate in the study area.
To further investigate the nature of water transactions, hourly average costs
of tubewell water application by tubewell owners are indicated in Table 3-12.
To derive the average costs, the sum of depreciation of tubewells, interest
payments, operators’ wages, imputed family wages, operation and mainte-
nance costs, and fuel and electricity costs was divided by the total number of
hours of operation. Theoretically, marginal costs should be estimated. How-
ever, because of data availability, average costs were used as their proxies. If
per-hour costs are well below the water rates, a high bargaining power of
water sellers is suggested. The average water cost was estimated at around
Rs. 13 per hour (the first column of Table 3-12). The ratio of the average water
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rates calculated from Table 3-11 to the average water costs was estimated at
around 1.5 in the first year, followed by 1.2 to 1.3 in the subsequent years (the
last column of Table 3-12). These figures are more or less smaller than those
estimated for Bangladesh and India (Fujita and Hossain 1995; Shah 1993).
This finding is consistent with the larger number of potential tubewell water
sellers in the study area. Competition among water sellers, whether explicit or
potential, might result in water rates which are not exploitatively high.
These investigations strongly suggest that private transactions of ground-
water pumped up by tubewells contribute to efficiency gains by giving non-
tubewell-owners access to additional water. To what extent this efficiency
gain is instrumental in equalizing production efficiency between owners and
nonowners will be investigated further below.
II. Estimation of Yield Variability
One of the unexplored issues in the empirical risk literature in Pakistan is the
extent of yield variability at the individual farm level (Chapter 2). This sec-
tion estimates parameters characterizing yield variability of four major crops
(basmati, kharif fodder, wheat, and rabi fodder) at the farm level.9 An empiri-
cal model is proposed in which crop yields vary according to household char-
acteristics and are subject to idiosyncratic risks. The yield risk perceived by
farmers is the variability of per-acre yield after differences due to these char-
acteristics are controlled.
1. The Empirical Model
Variability in the regional average of per-unit yield is assumed to be com-
mon among sample households. However, an individual household encoun-
ters a production risk that differs from the risk in the average yield for two
reasons. First, output yields at the individual farm level are affected by idio-
syncratic risks such as field-specific production problems. By definition, idio-
syncratic risks are statistically independent of common risks that affect sample
households equally. Due to the existence of the idiosyncratic yield risk, the
coefficient of variation (CV) of individual yield is larger than that of average
yield. Second, technology is not identical among households in farm produc-
tion activities. Expected yield and yield variance may differ from farmer to
farmer due to differences in, for example, land quality, ownership of machin-
ery, and the educational level of the household head.
Incorporating these two aspects, a simple model of yield multiplier in the
following form is adopted:
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where yhit is the per-unit yield of farm activity i for household h in year t,
assumed to be a product of yit and a household yield multiplier ui(Zht)+ηhit; yit
is the average yield in year t that is also stochastic due to the common shock;
ui(Zht) represents a deterministic portion of the household yield multiplier,
where Zht is a vector of household characteristics that affect yield distribution;
and ηhit is an additive idiosyncratic error with mean zero.
The function ui(Zht) could be interpreted as a reduced-form equation of house-
hold production decisions. If the theory of duality holds, the function becomes
a supply function of per-acre yields with the vector Zht consisting of market
prices and household characteristics of fixed production assets; and if the du-
ality theory breaks down, the function should also include household con-
sumption characteristics in the vector Zht (Pope 1982; Pope and Just 1991).
Because the data cover a three-year period with price variations that are al-
most collinear with yearly dummies, price variables are not included.
A convenient aspect of model (3.1) is that a square root of the estimated
variance of ηhit has an intuitive meaning of the coefficient of variation of yields
due to idiosyncratic shocks. If this number is high, it implies that individual
yields vary significantly around the average yield in the year. To define yit in a
consistent manner, the model was estimated for the subset of sample house-
holds that were surveyed continuously.
As shown in (3.1), the function ui(Zht) is approximated linearly with the
household characteristic variables represented by a dummy variable for trac-
tor ownership (TRDUMMY), a dummy variable for tubewell ownership
(TWDUMMY), the number of family members per acre (FAMA), and the years
of completed education of the household head (EDU). Since these variables
are predetermined when households decide on land allocation, they are treated
as exogenous variables in the estimation. The variables are constructed based
on the household data described in Chapter 2. To extract full information on
the panel data, another model with household dummies was estimated also.
This model is expected to correct the bias from unobserved household char-
acteristics by what is known in the panel data analysis as “fixed effects” (Judge
et al. 1985, ch. 13). One disadvantage of the model with fixed effects is that
coefficients on agricultural machinery dummies become unstable due to their
high collinearity with household dummies. Therefore, the discussion below
on estimation results is mostly based on the specification without household
fixed effects.
(3.1)
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2. Estimation Results
Estimation results for a model without household dummies are given in
Table 3-13 together with statistics of the exogenous variables. Estimation re-
sults with household fixed effects are reported in Table 3-14. The education
level of the household head EDU raises the yield significantly for basmati,
wheat, and rabi fodder. Therefore, education improves management efficiency
in the farm, as emphasized in the literature on human capital (Schultz 1961;
Lockheed, Jamison, and Lau 1980; Jamison and Lau 1982).
If the coefficient on TWDUMMY is significantly different from zero, it im-
plies that water markets are not functioning well because factor marginal
productivities are not equalized between owners and nonowners. If the
coefficient is positive, it implies that households with tubewells enjoyed higher
productivity. This is consistent with the hypothesis of the owner’s superiority
in water input use over water buyers. On the other hand, an orthodox theory
of waterseller’s monopoly implies that marginal productivity of water should
be higher for water buyers’ land because of price discrimination. A negative
coefficient on TWDUMMY is consistent with this hypothesis.
As Table 3-13 shows, the tubewell ownership dummy has a positive effect
on basmati and kharif fodder yields, although it is not statistically significant.
The sign is negative for wheat and rabi fodder crops, but again the coefficients
are not statistically significant. Results reported in Table 3-14 are also mixed.
These findings are consistent with the existence of an active water market.
Once the cropping choice is made, whether the supplementary water comes
from households’ own tubewells or from water markets does not affect crop
yields significantly.
The above statement does not mean that water markets are perfect. It merely
suggests that factor marginal productivities are likely to be equalized among
sample households. Another, stronger version of the hypothesis of efficient
water markets should require that households’ production decisions be sepa-
rable from their status in tubewell ownership. Chapter 6 will show that the
effect of tubewell ownership is more evident in land allocation decisions. In
this sense, water transactions among sample households failed to achieve full
gains from trade.
The coefficients on the tractor ownership dummy are not significant, either.
The existence of an active tractor-service market explains this lack of
significance.
3. Importance of Idiosyncratic Risks
Overall fit of the regression results in Table 3-13 is not good, suggesting
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TABLE  3-13
REGRESSION RESULTS OF YIELD MULTIPLIER MODEL
Statistics of
Basmati Wheat Independent
Variablesa
Constant 0.944 0.924 0.996 1.008
(19.9) (26.0) (19.9) (28.4)
TRDUMMY −0.072 0.054 0.045 −0.056 0.107
(1.38) (1.39) (0.81) (1.46) [0.310]
TWDUMMY 0.042 0.040 −0.056 −0.006 0.695
(1.09) (1.38) (1.39) (0.22) [0.462]
FAMA −0.007 0.032 −0.001 −0.014 1.202
(0.33) (2.15) (0.07) (0.95) [0.900]
EDU 0.019 0.001 0.017 0.008 2.288
(4.26) (0.44) (3.78) (2.60) [3.576]
Mean of dependent
variable 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Standard deviation of
dependent variable 0.217 0.151 0.226 0.154
Number of observations 177 171 177 176
R2 0.111 0.036 0.089 0.049
Square root of
the estimated variance 0.207 0.150 0.218 0.152
Source: See Table 3-1.
Notes : 1. Dependent variables = multiplier over average yield in each year.
2. Continuously surveyed households only.
3. The absolute values of t-statistics are indicated in the parenthesis.
4. Estimated by ordinary least squares.
a Means are given first, followed by the standard deviations in brackets.
Kharif
Fodder
Rabi
Fodder
that idiosyncratic risk is important in determining yields. The square roots of
the estimated variance of ηhit range from 0.15 to 0.22. The results are similar
when household fixed effects are corrected—the square roots are in the range
of 0.11 to 0.18, only slightly smaller than indicated by Table 3-13.10 These
findings are supported further by examining the household data from a differ-
ent angle. Table 3-2 showed that the sample average of annual basmati yield
was the highest in the second year, followed closely by that in the first year.
The third year suffered a bad harvest. Nevertheless, yield pattern at the indi-
vidual household level is different from the average pattern. The households
that experienced a worse yield in the first or second year than in the last year
numbered twenty-two out of fifty-nine, implying that more than one-third of
the sample households experienced an adverse idiosyncratic shock in the years
of good harvests on average.
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TABLE  3-14
REGRESSION RESULTS OF YIELD MULTIPLIER MODEL WITH HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECTS
Kharif Rabi
Fodder Fodder
TRDUMMY −0.118 0.202 0.155 −0.021
(1.37) (2.34) (1.59) (0.34)
TWDUMMY 0.118 0.043 −0.098 −0.005
(2.59) (0.95) (1.90) (0.14)
FAMA −0.037 0.025 −0.085 −0.037
(0.73) (0.49) (1.47) (1.00)
EDU 0.194 0.188 0.217 0.190
(9.20) (9.07) (9.12) (12.5)
Household dummiesa (omitted to save space)
R2 0.660 0.352 0.600 0.656
Square root of
the estimated variance 0.157 0.152 0.177 0.112
Source : See Table 3-1.
Notes : 1. Dependent variables = multiplier over average yield in each year.
2. Continuously surveyed households only.
3. The absolute values of t-statistics are indicated in the parenthesis.
4. Estimated by ordinary least squares.
5. See Table 3-13 for the statistics of variables and the number of observa-
tions.
a Only those household dummies that are not completely collinear with TRDUMMY
and TWDUMMY are included. The number of those independent dummies is 58.
Basmati Wheat
Similarly, the average wheat yield in the region was very high in the first
year, followed by two bad years. The sample households that experienced the
highest yield in the second or third year numbered ten out of fifty-nine. These
households experienced a favorable idiosyncratic shock in the years of bad
harvests on average.
Therefore, idiosyncratic disturbances were found to be important in deter-
mining crop yields at the individual farm level in the region. In the ICRISAT
villages in semiarid India with mostly rain-fed agriculture, the CVs of crop
yields at individual farms were estimated to range from 31 per cent to 69 per
cent (Walker and Ryan 1995, Table 8.5). Since Walker and Ryan’s numbers
reflect a mixture of common and idiosyncratic risks, they are not strictly com-
parable to the estimates here. But it might be safe to conclude that irrigated
agriculture in the Pakistan Punjab is subject to idiosyncratic yield shocks that
may be smaller than in the ICRISAT area but larger than we expect from 100
per cent irrigated agriculture.
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III. Summary and Conclusions
In the first section of this chapter, farming activities of sample households
have been described. Sample households’ cropping pattern is dominated by a
major cash crop (basmati), a staple food crop (wheat), and green fodder crops
for livestock. Every household in the region combines crop activities and live-
stock activities in one farm. Milk production is the most important livestock
activity, for which, green fodder is the major input. Milk is not only an impor-
tant consumption item but also an important source of income.
Households in the region face several types of production risks. Variability
in crop yields has been estimated in the second section using a model that
distinguishes common and idiosyncratic risks. It has been found that idiosyn-
cratic yield risk is important to the extent that the coefficient of variation of
yields at the farm level ranges from around 11 per cent to 22 per cent.
In the study area, tubewell irrigation in addition to canal irrigation has be-
come popular with active groundwater transactions. Because of the active
water transactions, crop yields at farms without tubewells are not significantly
lower than those at farms owning tubewells. Nevertheless, the production risk
of irrigation water is significant. It is conjectured that households' cropping
decisions are affected more by control of the irrigation risk, which is possible
with tubewell ownership, than crop yields are. This conjecture will be verified
in Chapter 6.
Chapters 2 and 3 have now provided sufficient information on production
characteristics of sample households. This information will be used in the
following chapters in which theoretical models of household behaviors are
applied to the study region. Before this application, another dimension of back-
ground information should be investigated: market institutions and price risk.
This is the topic of the next chapter.
Notes
1 One maund is equivalent to approximately 40 kg.
2 See Smale (1987) for the adoption of harvesting mechanization in the rice-wheat
zone.
3 For instance, the tractor charge per acre for basmati preparatory ploughing was
Rs. 50/run (one run takes about 0.5 hour), that for basmati preparatory planking
was Rs. 20/run (one run takes about 0.25 hour), that for basmati seedbed plough-
ing was Rs. 60/run (one run takes about 0.75 hour), and that for basmati seedbed
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planking was Rs. 30/run (one run takes about 0.25 hour). Hired workers for paddy
transplanting were paid around Rs. 40/day, those hired for basmati harvesting
and threshing were paid 1/10 to 1/8 of basmati output, those hired for wheat
harvesting were paid 1.5 to 3.5 maunds of wheat per acre, and workers hired for
wheat threshing were usually paid around 20 kg of wheat per day.
4 The adult-animal equivalent units (AU) used in this study are obtained from the
Punjab Economic Research Institute and as follows. Draft animals: 1.0 for adult
bullocks /he-buffaloes, 0.57 for young bullocks / he-buffaloes, 0.57 for adult don-
keys, 0.28 for young donkeys, and 1.0 for adult horses. Milch animals: 1.28 for
adult she-buffaloes, 0.96 for young she-buffaloes, 0.72 for adult cows, 0.54 for
young cows, and 0.20 for adult goats. Equivalent units slightly different from the
above are also used in Pakistan. Qualitative results in this study were unchanged
if different units were used.
5 The required fodder acreage for self-sufficiency was estimated at 0.35 (0.19) acres/
AU in kharif and 0.24 (0.12) acres/AU in rabi. Standard deviations are indicated
in the parenthesis and the number of observations is 170 in kharif and 174 in rabi.
6 This condition is not necessary for a certain class of production technology. For
example, the constant-returns-to-scale specification in Feder (1980) results in the
independence of input choice from land allocation decisions.
7 This definition is also used in the structural household model in Chapters 6 and 8.
Results in the text were unchanged if the current fallow was excluded.
8 Land and livestock were major sources of wealth for sample households. Results
were unchanged if house value was excluded.
9 The section is based on Kurosaki (1997).
10 “Only slightly smaller” in a sense that net-profit variability at the farm level esti-
mated from Table 3-13 is very close to that estimated from Table 3-14 (see Tables
5-3 and 5-4 in Chapter 5).
